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In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free.
Cheap Talk by Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin. Published in volume 10, issue 3, pages 103-118 of Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1996, Abstract: Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms.
19 lug 2022 · Are your words credible? Or are they what Paul Oyer calls “cheap talk”? According to Oyer, a professor of economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business, how our words align with our actions isn’t just a matter of communication, but a matter of economics too.
12 giu 2007 · CHEAP-TALK Senders must di er in preferences over Receiver actions. Why? Otherwise all Sender types induce the same action. This rules out: 1.Cheap Talk in Labor Market 2.Cheap Talk about Quality Cheap Talk Sobel
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Lecture 19: Costly Signaling vs. Cheap Talk – 15.025 Game Theory for Strategic Advantage – Spring 2015
If there is too strong an incentive to lie, cheap talk becomes meaningless. However, even if there is some limited incentive to lie, cheap talk can convey some meaning in equilibrium. As these principles suggest, cheap talk matters in a variety of mixed-motive economic interactions involving private information.
Talk is cheap! Examples: Your doctor tells you that you should go through an expensive MRI test. Your investment analyst recommends you to buy/sell stocks of a particular company. A lobbyist (expert on a particular topic) informs a politician about the current conditions in a given industry, high schools, natural parks, etc.
