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1. host.kelley.iu.edu › riharbau › PersuasionByCheapTalkPersuasion by Cheap Talk - Kelley School of Business

   host.kelley.iu.edu › riharbau › PersuasionByCheapTalk

   Persuasion by Cheap Talk. By ARCHISHMAN CHAKRABORTY AND RICK HARBAUGH. We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multi-dimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker.

2. econweb.ucsd.edu › 20070612_cheaptalknotesCheap Talk - University of California, San Diego

   econweb.ucsd.edu › 20070612_cheaptalknotes

   12 giu 2007 · CHEAP-TALK Senders must di er in preferences over Receiver actions. Why? Otherwise all Sender types induce the same action. This rules out: 1.Cheap Talk in Labor Market 2.Cheap Talk about Quality Cheap Talk Sobel

   • Dimensioni file: 136KB

   • Numero di pagine: 40

3. pubs.aeaweb.org › doi › pdfplusCheap Talk - American Economic Association

   pubs.aeaweb.org › doi › pdfplus

   If there is too strong an incentive to lie, cheap talk becomes meaningless. However, even if there is some limited incentive to lie, cheap talk can convey some meaning in equilibrium. As these principles suggest, cheap talk matters in a variety of mixed-motive economic interactions involving private information.

4. host.kelley.iu.edu › bepp2006-10-chakraborty-harbaughPersuasion by Cheap Talk

   host.kelley.iu.edu › bepp2006-10-chakraborty-harbaugh

   Persuasion by Cheap Talk. Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh∗. Forthcoming in American Economic Review This version includes Online Appendix. Abstract. We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multi-dimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker.

5. www.jstor.org › stable › 41038766Persuasion by Cheap Talk - JSTOR

   www.jstor.org › stable › 41038766

   In this paper we reexamine the potential for credible cheap talk by a very biased expert. In contrast with most of the cheap talk literature, we assume that the expert knows about multiple aspects of a decision problem. For instance, a salesperson has information about more than one product or about multiple attributes of a single product.

6. host.kelley.iu.edu › riharbau › ClearlyBiasedExpertsPersuasion by Cheap Talk

   host.kelley.iu.edu › riharbau › ClearlyBiasedExperts

   Persuasion by Cheap Talk. By ARCHISHMAN CHAKRABORTY AND RICK HARBAUGH∗. We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multi-dimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker.

7. economics.yale.edu › sites › defaultCheap Talk with Transparent Motives - Yale Department of...

   economics.yale.edu › sites › default

   This paper analyzes the extent to which such experts benefit from cheap talk.1 We consider a general cheap talk model with one substantive assumption: the sender has transparent motives. Thus, we start with a receiver facing a decision problem with incomplete information.