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Jonathan Peter Dancy FBA (born 8 May 1946) is a British philosopher, who has written on ethics and epistemology. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at University of Texas at Austin and Research Professor at the University of Reading. He taught previously for many years at the University of Keele.
The main overall focus of my work here was the attempt to construct a viable form of realism, with an associated metaphysics, theory of motivation and theory of moral experience, if so it can be called. I am best known for the distinctively particularist slant that I put on these matters.
24 set 2014 · During the last three decades, Jonathan Dancy's work has opened up new avenues in many areas of philosophy. Seven of the fourteen papers in this volume relate in one way or another to Dancy's influential work on particularism in ethics and holism about reasons, and with one exception, they are all largely sympathetic.
Professor Dancy is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Moral Reasons, Berkeley: An Introduction, Practical Reality, and Ethics Without Principles, as well as articles on many philosophical subjects. He is the editor of Perceptual Knowledge, Reading Parfit, Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues ...
Jonathan Dancy works within almost all fields of philosophy but is best known as the leading proponent of moral particularism. Particularism challenges “traditional” moral theories, such as Contractualism, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, in that it denies that moral thought and judgement relies upon, or is made possible by, a set of more or ...
14 apr 2019 · Dancy rejects an argument by Joseph Raz that the truth of a belief is not a value that intrinsically attaches to it, giving the reason, which is at once plausible and central to his particularism, that a value can be intrinsic and yet not unconditional (p. 99).
22 nov 2018 · Jonathan Dancy is known for defending bold and often controversial positions. Practical Shape, in which Dancy defends what he calls a ‘Neo-Aristotelian’ theory of reasoning, is no exception in that regard.
