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  1. Actor, writer, artist. Stephen Finlay (30 November 1956 – 14 February 2004) was an English actor, writer and artist. He trained as an artist at the Camberwell School of Arts and Crafts and then as an actor at the Central School of Speech and Drama in London. [1] He is the son of actor Frank Finlay. [2]

  2. Stephen Finlay is a professor at Australian Catholic University, Dianoia Institute of Philosophy. They are interested in Meta-Ethics, Normativity and Naturalism, Value Relativism, Moral Semantics, Internalism and Externalism about Moral Judgment, Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism, Misc, Moral Psychology, Misc, Reasons, Misc, and Philosophy of ...

  3. 16 apr 2014 · Oxford University Press. Book. Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. Get access. Stephen Finlay. Published: 16 April 2014. Cite. Permissions. Share. Abstract. Can normative words like ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’ be defined in entirely non-normative terms?

    • Stephen Finlay
  4. Stephen Finlay. Adjunct Professor of Philosophy. Pronouns He / Him / His Email finlay@usc.edu Office STO 114A Office Phone (213) 821-2219. Links. Research Page. Dianoia Institute of Philosophy - Staff Profile.

  5. 9 ott 2007 · Philosophy Compass. Four Faces of Moral Realism. Stephen Finlay. First published: 09 October 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x. Citations: 22. Read the full text. PDF. Tools. Share. Abstract. This article explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate.

  6. Stephen Finlay. Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at ACU & University of Southern California. ... G Björnsson, S Finlay. Ethics 121 (1), 7-36, 2010. 171: 2010: Oughts ...

  7. 18 apr 2016 · Stephen Finlays Confusion of Tongues (COT) is an ambitious book. Its first half advances a unifying semantics for normative words, including ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’. In the second half, he argues that this semantics, combined with a single pragmatic principle, can explain the uses of such expressions of special interest to ethicists.